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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO M. BERTAGNOLE, INC., 
a corporation, BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP (Substituted) , 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
PINE MEADOW RANCHES, 
a corporation, et al, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16900 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
As in the previous brief, appellants will be referred 
to as plaintiffs and respondents will be referred to as 
defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LIS PENDENS WAS SUFFICIENT 
UNDER STATE LAW 
With respect to defendant's statement of facts, 
reference is made to Section 78-40-2, UCA 1953, relating to 
Lis Pendens. The cited statute provides a means of giving 
constructive notice of the pendency of an action which in 
effect is a republication of the pleadings in the underlying 
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action. See Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P2d 186. 
In the instant case, appellants recorded a Lis Pend~ 
describing the property to which plaintiffs claimed ownership 
and to which plaintiff owned legal title on August 19, 1974. 
(R 221, 222) The Lis Pendens stated the court and cause, 
described the property in question and certainly would have led 
anyone who wanted more information to the case file. Neither 
defendants nor anyone else was claiming any right or interest 
in the subject property in Section 35, Township 1 North, Range 
4 East, by written or recorded document. 
At the time the lawsuit was filed, plaintiff served 
all those of which plaintiff was aware who might be using the 
road in question, making them parties of the action, and in 
addition served unknown defendants by publication. It should 
be noted that the actual parties to the lawsuit received SUIIllllonses 
and complaints, which is actual notice and more encompassing than 
any notice in a Lis Pendens. 
Defendants' argument that the Lis Pendens should have 
been more specific and included lands miles away from the sub-
ject property would have the effect of requiring plaintiffs 
to anticipate and speculate as to every possible user of the 
land and place no burden on one claiming some possessory 
interest in property to which he has no legal title to as-
certain his legal rights. Certainly if one intends to exercise 
some possessory right over property, such as using it as an 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
access road, he should have some obligation to investigate 
his title or claim of right to that property over which he is 
claiming a possessory interest. 
It is well established that in a quiet title action 
plaintiff can prevail by showing his own record title. In 
such case, constructive possession is presumed in absence of 
evidence to the contrary. 
Gibson v. McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 106 P 669. 
Any person interested in property above plaintiff 
could have checked the County records to see who owned prop-
erty over which access is dependant. Such an investigation 
would have disclosed the Lis Pendens and led to the pleadings 
of the instant case. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE AND LAW DO NOT 
SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
In defendant's brief, at page 16, defendant asserts 
that plaintiff "has refrained from citing any of the mountain 
road cases such as Lindsay Land & Livestock v. Churnos, 
Sullivan v. Condas, Jeremy v. Bertagnole, and Boyer v. Clark." 
Defendants' brief further states, "It is apparent 
that more stringent evidentiary tests have been applied by 
the Supreme Court in the valley, short distance road cases, 
such as Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P2d 646 (dead 
-3-
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end street called McClelland Street in Salt Lake City) and 
Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P 2d 5lf.5." 
The above-cited cases represent all of the cases 
cited by defendant in his brief. 
The following is a discussion of each of the cases 
referred to by defendants with an explanation below each 
case as to why it is not in point in the instant case: 
1. Lindsay Land and Livestock v. Churnos, 75 Utah 
285 p 646: 
The trial court found that in 1876 a described road-
way was laid out over the land in question when it was part of 
the public domain. The evidence is further sUmm.arized as 
follows: 
A. At the end of the road were public and private 
lands suitable for grazing and was used extensively for grazing. 
B. In 1876, a sawmill was constructed and the road 
used by people generally to haul logs to the sawmill and lumber 
from the sawmill. 
C. Other sawmills were set up along this road before 
1890. 
D. In 1885 mining was developed and houses were 
built, a post office established and hundreds of people resided 
in the mining camp for more than five years. 
E. The road was traveled extensively by the general 
public in going to and from the mining camp. 
-4-
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F. During all periods the road was used by numerous 
owners of sheep, "a hundred herds", as many as seven herds a 
day going over the road. 
In the instant case the road in question dated back 
to 1915 and was then used for hauling supplies to sheepherders 
on private land. There was also some evidence which was not 
tied to specific periods when deer hunters and fishermen were 
seen and when picnics were held, but this evidence was at best 
very sketchy. There was no evidence of any general use by the 
public until about 1972 when subdivision lots were sold just 
two years before this lawsuit was commenced. 
In holding that a public road had been established 
in Lindsay Land and Livestock v. Churnos, the following was 
stated: 
"We think the evidence established a general 
public use of the road. If the claim rested alone 
upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or 
for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, 
the question would be more difficult. But here 
the road connected two points between which there 
was occasion for considerable public travel. The 
road was a public convenience. When sawmills were 
established on or near the road, it was used, not 
only by those conducting the sawmills, but by many 
others who went to the sawmills to get lumber, etc. 
During the period when the mining camp existed in 
the vicinity, ~he road was unquestionably used 
very extensively by the general public for general 
purposes. And all the time it was used as a general 
way for the driving or trailing of sheep. This 
latter use was not by a few persons, but by many 
persons, and it involved more than the mere driving 
of animals on the road. Camp outfits and supplies 
accompanied the herds and were moved over the road 
in camp wagons and on pack horses. While it is 
-5-
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difficult to fix a standard by which to measure 
what is a public use or a public thoroughfare, it 
can be said here that the road was used by many 
and different persons for a variety of purposes; 
that it was open to all who desired to use it; 
that the use made of it was as general and exten-
sive as the situation and surroundings would 
permit, had the road been formally laid out as a 
public highway by public authority. 
The facts of the above-cited case with its road 
established before patent and very extensive use for a number 
of purposes is not a precedent for and is very different from 
the use which has been proven in the instant case. 
2. Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 583, 290 P 954: 
It is again important to look at the facts set forth 
in the case. The road in question existed as -early as 1873 
while the land on which it was established was part of the public 
domain and before the patent was issued. Specific evidence of 
use is not discussed in the case except to say that the road was 
used generally by the public as occasion required in going up 
and down the canyon. The court stated that because the public 
uses were established over public lands before the patent was 
issued, the patent was taken subject to that public right. 
No evidence has been presented in the instant case 
as to existence of a road or use before the patent was issued. 
Because the facts of Sullivan v. Condas do not describe actual 
use to establish the public right, it cannot be compared to 
the instant case in determining a standard of necessary use. 
-6-
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3. Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P 2d 420: 
The facts again indicate that the public use was 
established before patent to the ground in question was issued. 
It should further be noted that the road in question connected 
State Highway U.S. 30-S with U.S. 40-530 and had been continu-
ously used for 60 years by ranchmen, stockmen, owners of land 
contiguous and adjacent thereto and by the public generally for 
all necessary and convenient purposes. In addition, both 
Morgan and Sunnnit Counties intervened to have the road declared 
publi'c. The Court held the road to be public based upon exten-
sive use. 
The instant case is very different in that no use 
was established before patent. The road does not connect two 
state. roads and the extensive public use is not present. Summit 
County has not intervened in the present case. 
4. B·oyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 39 5, 326 P 2d 107: 
Th.ts case was cited by plaintiff at page 13 of the 
plaintiffs•, brief. 
Again, this case concerned a road for which use was 
estaoli~hed as public before the patent was issued. The road 
in question was used to haul coal, drive sheep and cattle, ride 
horses or w~gons, deer hunting, visiting people in the vicinity, 
going to .. dances held in Grass Creek, as well as trailing sheep 
or cattle. This road rand from State Highway No. 133 to Grass 
Creek, thus connecting a residential area with a state highway. 
-7-
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The facts again are different from the instant case 
in that there are not two points of public area to be connected 
as in Boyer v. Clark. Instead the road in question goes to 
private land used in the past for livestock grazing. The 
present subdivision and residential uses were not in existence 
during any ten year period prior to filing the lawsuit, and 
there is not the evidence of the consistent regular public uses 
as in Boyer v. Clark. 
Taking all of the above cases together, they all con-
cern roads'established prior to patent, they all had roads used 
for purposes for which there was a public need, such as grazing 
on public lands, serving residential establishments and connecting! 
state highways or communities. None of these public needs exist 
in the instant case. The land above the road in question is 
private land. Except for sheep men who may have acquired some 
prescriptive right, the uses of the road were by guests, tres-
passers or owners of land using the road without permission. 
Defendants are seeking to have the road declared a public road 
to serve defendants' subdivision which came into existence only 
two years before the lawsuit was filed. Even this use does not 
serve the public as all land is privately owned. 
With respect to the other cases defendants cited, 
Bonner v. Sudbury relates to a dead end alley located in Salt 
Lake City which was platted in 1915 as a city street; it was 
paved by the city; street signs were maintained by the city; 
-8-
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the owner had not paid taxes for 25 years on the ground, and it 
was used by the general public for a variety of activities. 
These facts are clearly far removed from the instant case. 
The last case cited by defendant, Peterson v. Combe, 
20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P2d 545, is a case which related to a 
road originally built by the owner to serve his own property 
and dead ending at his property boundary. A subdivider 
acquired the property adjoining the dead end and proceeded to 
build houses served by the road. The trial court found a public 
road, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed holding that the road 
was not a public road and stated the principal in these types of 
cases that there must be competent evidence of witnesses who are 
not self-serving to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the public generally, not just a few having their own special and 
private interest in the road, had used it continuously for ten 
years. The court further stated that the road would have to be 
condemned for a public use. The time frame involving the sub-
division in the instant case and in Peterson v. Combe is similar 
and the principles of that case are applicable to the present 
-
case. The witnesses called by defendants were •ei!=h;er .. present 
owners of all or some of the property above the property in 
question or predecessors in interest and are therefore self-
serving witnesses as described in Peterson v. Combe, having a 
direct interest in the outcome. This is not the clear and con-
vincing evidence mentioned in Peterson v. Combe. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
The cases cited in the defendants' brief are not in 
point for the reasons stated above. There is no evidence that 
a highway 30 feet wide had been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a ten year period prior to the filing of this 
suit in 1974. No evidence has been presented that a road was 
in existence before a patent was issued. There is no evidence 
in this case of a public need for a public road. All of the 
land served by the road in question is and during all uses in 
evidence was private land. Deer hunters, fishermen, picnickers 
were all trespassing, not only on the road, but in most cases on 
the land where they were carrying out their activities. Private 
land owners and their guests may or may not have some private 
prescriptive right, but they have an obligation to inquire into 
and assure their access rights. There is no -public interest 
served by providing an access road to a private subdivision as 
i$ the case here and in Peterson v. Combe. For the reasons 
stated, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and 
the title to the road in question quieted in plaintiff. 
By: 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN AND SKEEN 
R. C. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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